Some writing on Gustav that inserts another perspective on the ordeal.

A few days ago, Paul Krugman, in typically rabid partisan form had another NYT Op-Ed on Gustav and FEMA.

The standard fare: the wonders of government bureaucracy cannot work without proper leadership (Dems who care) and the GOP simply produced a self-fulfilled prophecy with the Katrina debacle....nothing more. IOW, good and effective government needs people who believe in it and it will work great.

My take is that "Bush's FEMA" could have done a slightly better job...but only on the margins; nothing spectacularly different. Much of the avoidable problem lay with the counter-productive mauling of FEMA and federal micro-management. Sure, they could have been little quicker here, a bit more pro-active there and thrown in some more helpful rhetoric. But the horror of Katrina would have been there anyway and little would have been different looking back a few years later. Sometimes, sad as it sounds, the abstract and fanciful idea of government agency working as planned and up to its best theoretical potential is the simply the precursor to disappointment and finger-pointing and convenient "I-told-ya-so" posturing from factions hell bent on believing the pathway from imagination to reality is a clear path that only needs leadership.

Little attention is paid to the private successes operating below the public radar. Scant is the consideration of alternatives. Dismissive is the attitude toward the likely perversions on organization wrought by flawed commerce laws on private initiative and the very mandate of FEMA on other levels of government and a myriad of decentralized possibilities. Non-existent is the respect for FEMA systemic limitations, imperfections and unavoidable inadequacies.

In response to Krugman's column, economist Steve Horwitz wrote a letter to the NYT Editor :

FEMA’s failures resulted from two problems endemic to bureaucracies no matter the party in power: a lack of local knowledge and weaker incentives than the private sector to succeed. By contrast, Wal-Mart got supplies and people into the worst-hit areas because its associates and managers had detailed knowledge of their communities and the incentive to help their neighbors that will always be absent in bureaucracies. FEMA’s warehouses of unused resources contrasted with Wal-Mart’s trucks on the move suggest that indeed the failures of Katrina were ones of bureaucratic ignorance, not administration ideology.

Along these lines, The Mercatus Center at George Mason had more to say.

Despite the self-congratulating, politicizing, posturing taking place by public officials on the "success" of the Gustav preparation, the real lessons from Katrina were elsewhere: don't rely on public statements to make your plans.

Evacuation started early and voluntarily. Supplies and help were ready from Wal-Mart, CVS and other local private bodies liasing with non-profits like the Red Cross and the Salvation Army and entrepreneurs in the form of emergency water, medication and a myriad of other necessities and contingencies to serve their local customers...not to fill a government order. Public action was largely flat and anti-climactic.

But here's the heart of it:

Much of the delay we've seen in rebuilding after Katrina has been caused by shifting rules of the game in rebuilding, as governments on all levels proved unable to make clear, credible commitments about what would be done and when.

Both the Obama and the McCain campaigns will be tempted to announce their plans for rebuilding programs. If the candidates are serious about helping the Gulf Coast, they'll stay silent about particular plans, save the requisite cheerleading, and let the non-profit groups and entrepreneurs who have been doing the heavy lifting in the three years following Katrina get in with their jobs. For the last three years, officials on all levels of government have been raising expectations, only to renege on promises that were unlikely — or even impossible — to be fulfilled.

As the recovery effort gets underway, it's critical that officials do not try to dictate the patterns of recovery. For the last three years, the most effective solutions to rebuilding the communities devastated by Katrina have relied on local knowledge that entrepreneurs, non-profit groups, community organizations, and groups of everyday citizens possess — and that nobody in Washington does.

To be effective, post-disaster recovery must be led by the people who have a stake — financial, social, and personal — in the success of the rebuilding. After the immediate needs are met, FEMA and other government groups need to pull back and avoid the temptation to try to micro-manage the recovery. A key lesson of Katrina is that grassroots, bottom-up efforts at rebuilding work, while top-down plans fail.

Government plays a role in this by supporting the people who are getting the work done, not by dictating to them. This means making and following through on commitments to things like reopening schools, road cleaning and maintenance, respecting property rights, and allowing freedom of contract. In this environment, grassroots solutions can thrive, and the affected areas will rebound more quickly and sustainably.

And if government can't make good on a commitment, it needs to make that clear and pass it off to someone who can.

FEMA can have a role in giving a hand. But that is different from being in charge.

Reforms are definitely in order for levee construction and national flood insurance says the Mercatus article. But most importantly, let's hope the relative timidity of Gustav compared to Katrina doesn't get people believing FEMA did a heckuva job so that they can take the next hurricane more lightly. They need to learn the real lessons that made this recovery easier: initiative and cooperation.